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FRANCHISE FLIGHT AND THE FORGOTTEN FAN: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST
LAWS TO THE RELOCATION OF
PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL FRANCHISES
I.

INTRODUCTION

One night in March of 1984, all that remained of the once proud
Baltimore Colts l was loaded secretly into a fleet of moving vans bound
for Indianapolis, Indiana. 2 This event marked the first time a National
Football League (NFL) team had moved to a new city without either the
league's approvaP or opposition. 4 Although the NFL remained silent,S
1. The Baltimore Colts contributed significantly to the success of the NFL. The Baltimore Sun, Feb. 2, 1986 at B 1 col. 1. The first real television success for the NFL
was the Colt's dramatic overtime win over the New York Giants in 1958. Referring
to that win, a former Colt recently remarked that the "Colts put the NFL on the
map and we should never let them forget that." The Baltimore Sun, Jan. 19, 1985,
at C4 col. 1. The Colts have contributed a number of players to the Professional
FootbalI HalI of Fame: Coach Webb Ewbank, John Unitas, Lenny Moore, Gino
Marchetti, Art Donovan, Jim Parker, and Raymond Berry. The best description of
the tradition that was once the Baltimore Colts comes from Baltimore sports columnist Bob Maisel who said "[t]he origins of the Colts are traced and the story line
carefulIy notes that the team was more than just a team. It was interwoven into the
very fabric of the city." The Baltimore Sun, Jan. 19, 1985, at C4, col. 1.
2. The Baltimore Sun, Mar. 29, 1984, at A2, col. 2.
3. There have been fourteen franchise relocations in professional football. Brooklyn
moved to DalIas, Texas, in 1952; the DalIas Texans moved to Baltimore, Maryland,
in 1953; the Chicago Cardinals of the NFL moved to St. Louis, Missouri, in 1960;
the Los Angeles Chargers of the AFL moved to San Diego, California, in 1961; the
DalIas Texans of the AFL moved to Kansas City, Missouri, in 1963; the Boston
Patriots moved to Foxboro, Massachusetts, in 1971; the DalIas Cowboys moved to
Irvine, Texas, in 1971; the Buffalo Bills moved to Orchard Park, New York, in
1973; the Detroit Lions moved to Pontiac, Michigan, in 1975; the New York Giants
moved to Rutherford, N.J., in 1976; the Los Angeles Rams moved to Anaheim,
California, in 1978; the Minnesota Vikings moved from Bloomington to Minneapolis, Minnesota, in 1932; the Oakland Raiders moved to Los Angeles, California, in
1982; and the Baltimore Colts moved to Indianapolis, Indiana, in 1984. Professional Sports Antitrust Immunity: Hearings on S.I72, S.259 and S.298 Before the
Comm. on the Judiciary United States Senate, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 301 (1985) (Rosenberg, Morton, Proposed Sports Relocation Legislation: Background and Legal
Implications).
4. The NFL officialIy denied the Oakland Raiders' request to move to Los Angeles.
See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
5. The City of Baltimore did not remain silent. The City instituted legal action to
condemn the Colt franchise through the novel use of its power of eminent domain.
City of Baltimore v. Baltimore Colts, Inc., No. 84-1294 (D. Md. filed - 1984). The
City and the Colts eventually settled alI legal actions between them. Under the
terms of the settlement, the City agreed not to pursue an appeal of its eminent domain suit that was lost in federal court in December, 1985, and not to pursue a
conspiracy suit filed against the Colts, the Mayor of Indianapolis and the moving
company that hauled the team's property out of Maryland. In return, the Colts
agreed to drop their pending suit against Baltimore's Mayor Schaefer and City
Council that charged that they violated the team's civil rights in trying to seize the
Colts under eminent domain. In addition, the City agreed to buy the Colts training
complex and the Colts would pay the City's legal fees incurred in the various law
suits. Finally, the Colts have promised to support Baltimore's efforts to secure an
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the most noticeable reaction to the uncontested relocation 6 came from
sports fans nationwide who realized that tradition no longer guided the
destiny of professional football because team owners evidently were free
to relocate their teams at any time and for any reason, without concern
for the interests of the host city or the rights of the local fan. 7
This comment will examine how the application of the antitrust
laws to professional football precipitated the Colts relocation and created
a climate in which teams can relocate more easily. The comment begins
by reviewing the development of general antitrust principles. Following
this review, the comment discusses the historical application of antitrust
laws to professional sports leagues and focuses on recent decisions that
have diminished the NFL's control over the relocation of franchises. Finally, the impact that uncontrolled franchise relocation has had on professional sports, recent legislative proposals intended to clarify the
situation, and other possible alternatives to the present system for
franchise relocation are examined.
II.

GENERAL ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES

Section 1 of the Sherman Act 8 (section 1) prohibits all contracts,
combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce. 9 Section 1 was enacted to prevent agreements that "restrict production, raise
prices or otherwise control the market to the detriment of purchasers or
consumers of goods and services." 10 When Congress enacted section 1,
however, it recognized that not all business agreements that appear to
restrain the agreeing parties' freedom of trading actually suppress com-

6.
7.
8.

9.

10.

expansion franchise and are also willing to discuss the possible return of the Colts
name to any future Baltimore football franchise. The Baltimore Sun, Mar. 18, 1986,
at AI, col. 5.
See infra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
In response to the public outcry, several bills have been introduced into Congress
that would restrict franchise relocation. See, e.g., S. 259, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985); S. 287, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R. 751, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
15 U.S.c. § 1 (1982). Section 1 provides: "Every contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal." Id. (emphasis added). In United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898) the Supreme
Court recognized that Congress could not have intended a literal interpretation of
the word "every."
15 U.S.c. § 1 (1982). See Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 331
(1904), where the Court held that the Sherman Act "embrace[s] and declare[s] to be
illegal every contract, combination, or conspiracy, in whatever form, of whatever
nature, and whoever may be parties to it, which directly or necessarily operates in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several states or with foreign nations . ... "
Id. (emphasis in original). The Court has recognized the need for limitations on the
broad sweep of the Act and has fashioned standards that "should be resorted to for
the purpose of determining whether the prohibition contained in the statute had or
had not in any given case been violated." Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
U.S. 1, 60 (1911).
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 (1940).
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petition. II For that reason, and because section 1 had to be adaptable to
changes in the marketplace, the drafters of section 1 "adopted flexible
language instead of narrow definitions of prohibited conduct."12
As a result of the broad and flexible language of section 1, there has
been an "evolutionary development of antitrust case law responsive to
changes in the market place."t3 In this regard, early in its interpretation
of section 1, the Supreme Court recognized that not all agreements alleged to be in restraint of trade actually suppress competition. 14 For that
reason, courts must evaluate agreements and determine, with deference
to the original purpose of the Sherman Act,15 whether the alleged restraints actually inhibit the development of competition or whether the
conditions of the particular industry justify the alleged restraints. In order to help courts efficiently make this determination, the Court has developed a two-part test that easily disposes of cases involving manifestly
anticompetitive practices and provides for in-depth review of cases where
joint action perhaps is justified. 16
The first part of the test focuses on agreements that are illegal per se.
Certain agreements or practices are illegal per se "because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue."17 These
agreements "are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore
illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused
or the business excuse for their use."18 For example, commercial arrangements such as horizontal price fixing, 19 division ofmarkets,20 resale
11. In United States v. Southern Pac. Co., 259 U.S. 214 (1922), the Court recognized
that a combination constituted an unlawful restraint of trade if it "fetter[ed] the free
and normal flow of competition in interstate traffic .... " Id. at 229; see also Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) ("the true test of
legality [under the Sherman Act] is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may
suppress or even destroy competition.").
12. A. AUSTIN, ANTITRUST: LAW, ECONOMICS, POLICY § 3.2 (1976).
13. /d.

14. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
15. See generally 1 E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW, pp. 125-242 (1980).
"Congress's overriding objective [in enacting the Sherman Act] was to attempt to
restore, as far as possible, a free and open competitive environment absent anticompetitive business restraints such as agreements to control production, prices or output, or to divide markets, or restrictions caused by monopolistic control over the
sources of raw materials or production of goods." /d. at 126.
16. See infra notes 17-25 and accompanying text.
17. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
18.Id.
19. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 151-52 (1968); United States v.
Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 274 (1942); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U.S. 150,228 (1940).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Ass'n, 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972); Timken Roller
Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.
v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 235-38 (1899). But see American Football League v.
NFL, 205 F. Supp. 60 (D. Md. 1962) (NFL did not violate Sherman Act by providing exclusive territories for its member clubs), aff'd, 323 F.2d 124, 131 (4th Cir.
1963).
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price maintenance,2) tying arrangements,22 and group boycotts23 all have
been recognized as per se violations of section 1.24
If a particular restraint is not per se illegal, the restraint then is evaluated under the second part of the test: the rule of reason. The "rule of
reason" is a judicially created test for evaluating an agreement alleged to
be in restraint of trade. 25 It requires that the factfinder weigh all the
circumstances of a case to decide whether restrictive practices should be
prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition. 26 In
this regard, the factfinder must balance an agreement's anticompetitive
effect with its competitive virtues and determine whether an unreasonable restraint on competition exists.
III.

THE APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAWS TO
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS

Since its inception, professional sports has enjoyed a unique affinity
with the American public. Sports have become a glorified institution in
this country and are an integral part of the everyday life of millions of
fans. Despite its revered position in American society, however, professional sports and their organizational practices consistently have been the
subject of antitrust challenges.

A.

Interstate Commerce

As early as 1922, the organizational practices of professional baseball were questioned in Federal Baseball Club v. National League of Pro21. See, e.g., United States v. Parke & Davis Co., 362 U.S. 29, 44 (1960); United States
v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 720 (1944); Copper Liquor, Inc. v.
Adolph Coors Co., 506 F.2d 934, 941 (5th Cir. 1975).
22. See, e.g., Northern Pac. R.R., 356 U.S. at 8; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337
U.S. 293, 314 (1949); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396
(1947). A tying arrangement is where a seller sells a product on condition that the
buyer purchase another product from that seller.
23. See, e.g., Northern Pac. R.R., 356 U.S. at 8; Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v.
United States, 345 U.S. 594, 609 (1953); Keifer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram &
Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951).
24. See 2 E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 9.20, at 57-58 (1980).
25. See Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). Justice
Brandeis articulated the test that has been uniformly adopted in evaluating a restraint under the rule of reason. He stated:
Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To
bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The true test of legality is
whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps
thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or
even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is
applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the
restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular
remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.
[d.
26. [d.
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fessional Baseball Clubs. 27 In Federal Baseball, a member of the Federal
League alleged that members of the National League destroyed the Federal League by buying some of the Federal League's constituent clubs. 28
The plaintiff claimed that by buying up the Federal League's clubs the
defendants brought under their control the entire business of baseball.
This, the plaintiff argued, amounted in law to a conspiracy in restraint of
trade or a monopoly or both. 29 The Supreme Court avoided deciding the
complicated antitrust issues involved in the case and held that "the business of giving exhibitions of baseball is purely a state affair."30 This holding essentially made baseball exempt from the antitrust laws because
section 1 only applies to restraints on interstate commerce. 31

The decision in Federal Baseball subsequently was upheld in Toolson v. New York Yankees.32 In Toolson, professional baseball players alleged that organized baseball exploited the players for the benefit of the
clubs and leagues through the use of the reserve clause. 33 The reserve
clause gave baseball clubs that first signed players the continuing and
exclusive right to the players' services. 34 The Court refused to reexamine
the underlying antitrust and interstate commerce issues involved in the
case and simply affirmed the judgment in favor of organized baseball on
the authority of Federal Baseball. 35
The Supreme Court's decision in Federal Baseball was not extended
to professional football. In Radovich v. NFL,36 a former NFL player alleged that the NFL violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act when
the NFL conspired with the Pacific Coast Football League to ban the
player's services. The San Francisco Clippers, a member of the NFL
affiliated Pacific Coast League, had prepared to sign Radovich as a
player-coach. The NFL intervened and advised the Pacific Coast League
not to sign Radovich because he was black-listed for deserting his former
NFL team. 37 The Court found that the "volume of interstate business
involved in organized professional football places it within the provisions
of the Sherman Act."38 In so finding, the Court refused to extend the
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

259 U.S. 200 (1922).
[d. at 207.
[d. at 205-06.
[d. at 208.
259 U.S. at 208-09.
346 U.S. 356 (1953).
[d. at 362-64.
[d. at 362 n.lD.
[d. at 357. The Court's reliance on Federal Baseball was based on four factors: 1)
Congress had not acted in contravention to the decision in Federal Baseball; 2)
baseball had developed in reliance on its antitrust exemption; 3) the Court's unwillingness to override Federal Baseball; and 4) deference to a legislative solution. [d.;
see also Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (affirming Toolson on similar grounds).
36. 352 U.S. 445, reh'g denied, 353 U.S. 931 (1957).
37. [d. at 448.
38. [d. at 452; see also United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955)
(Federal Baseball not extended to boxing); United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222
(1955) (Federal Baseball not extended to the theater). Justice Frankfurter, with
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decision in Federal Baseball to professional football leagues. Similarly,
both basketba1l 39 and hockey40 have been held to be businesses involved
in interstate commerce and thus subject to the federal antitrust laws. 41

B.

Organizational Practices

There is a unique and indispensible need for economic interdependence between members of professional sports leagues. 42 Because true
athletic competition cannot exist without two or more teams, teams that
are members of sports leagues have found it necessary to reduce the economic competition between themselves in order to facilitate financial stability, and thus parity, within the league. 43 By reducing economic
competition and combining economic resources, however, sports leagues
have exposed their practices to challenges under the anticonspiracy and
antimonopoly provisions of the Sherman Act. 44
The first antitrust challenge to a joint economic agreement between
NFL owners involved the NFL's restrictions on television contracts. In
United States v. NFL,45 the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania held that NFL owners could not, by agreement,
restrict the areas within which telecasts of league games could be made.
This, the court held, was an unlawful conspiracy in restraint of trade. 46
This decision subsequently was extended when the NFL petitioned that
same court for a clarification of its earlier decision. 47 The NFL owners
some foresight into the problems that were likely to ensue as a result of the inconsistencies created by Federal Baseball, International Boxing, Shubert, and Radovich,
said: "It would batHe the subtlest ingenuity to find a single differentiating factor
between other sporting exhibitions, whether boxing or football or tennis, and baseball insofar as the conduct of the sport is relevant to the criteria or considerations by
which the Sherman [Act] becomes applicable to a 'trade or commerce.' " International Boxing, 348 U.S. at 248 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
39. See Haywood v. NBA, 401 U.S. 1204, 1205 (1971) (professional basketball not exempt from antitrust laws).
40. See San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. NHL, 379 F. Supp. 966, 968 (C.D. Cal. 1974)
(major league hockey subject to federal antitrust laws).
41. See Glick, Professional Sports Franchise Movements and the Sherman Act: When
and Where Teams Should Be Able to Move, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 55, 58-59
(1983).
42. J. WEISTART & c. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS 757 (1979).
43.Id.
44. See Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. NFL v. Oakland Raiders, Ltd., 469 U.S. 990 (1984); see also
North Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249, 1251 (2d Cir.) (professional
football league's ban on members owning teams in competing leagues violated the
Sherman Act), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982).
45. 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953). Although this case occurred prior to Radovich
the court found it unnecessary to address whether professional football itself was
engaged in interstate commerce. Instead, the court determined that this case concerned only restrictions imposed by the NFL on the sale of radio and television
rights. Radio and television, the court held, were clearly in interstate commerce.
116 F. Supp. at 327-28.
46. Id. at 330.
47. United States v. NFL, 196 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
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sought a declaratory judgment that the league could negotiate television
contracts on behalf of its member clubs without violating section 1. 48
The government opposed this practice and argued that the NFL's practice of negotiating television contracts on behalf of its member clubs was
an unlawful conspiracy in restraint of trade. 49 The court held that an
agreement negotiated by the NFL granting a network the exclusive right
to televise games was prohibited by the Sherman Act.50
In response to this decision, Congress enacted the Telecasting of
Professional Sports Contests Act. 51 This Act authorizes the member
clubs of a professional football, baseball, basketball, or hockey league to
pool their rights in the telecasting of their games and permits the league
to sell the resulting package to a television network 52 without violating
antitrust laws. 53 Congress enacted the Telecasting of Professional Sports
Contests Act because it recognized that a restriction placed solely on the
NFL, and not on other professional leagues, would be inequitable. 54
48. Id. at 446.
49.Id.
50. Id. at 447.
51. 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982) states:
The antitrust laws ... shall not apply to any joint agreement by or among
persons engaging in or conducting the organized professional team sports
of football, baseball, basketball or hockey by which any league ... sells or
otherwise transfers all or any part of the rights of such league's member
clubs in the sponsored telecasting of the games....
52. 15 U.S.c. § 1291 (1982); see S. Rep. No. 1087, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in
1961 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3042-44.
53. Recently, the NFL's ability to negotiate exclusive television contracts with the networks was unsuccessfully contested. The United States Football League's (USFL)
former representative in charge of negotiating television contracts, Eddie Einhorn,
accused all three major networks of being "in cahoots" with the NFL against the
USFL. Einhorn wrote: "I am firmly convinced that we [USFL) will never get a fair
market [television] contract for USFL football in the fall unless the courts or the
federal government intercede on our behalf and force the NFL to offer its product to
no more than two networks and maybe one." The Baltimore Sun, Feb. 19, 1985 at
Cl, col. 4.
54. S. Rep. No. 1087, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1961 U.S. CODE CONGo &
AD. NEWS 3042-44. Specifically, Congress justified its action on the following bases: 1) The AFL, the NBA, and the NHL all separately pooled their television
rights into a single package for sale to the networks; 2) economic parity would be
maintained in the league; 3) weaker teams would be protected, and league structure
and operation would not be imperiled; and 4) college football would be protected.
Id.
In addition, Congress wanted to help preserve the substantial number of college
educational programs that were dependent on college football for revenue by not
impairing college football gate receipts through network telecasts of professional
football games at times when college games were normally played. The Act ensured
that most college football games would be played on Saturday and most professional
football games would be played on Sunday. In this manner, Congress aided in the
formation of the NFL's present format because it guaranteed a single day of each
week during the football season for scheduled games. This system, however, was
challenged. The newly formed USFL filed an antitrust suit in federal court in New
York against the NFL alleging that the NFL held a monopoly on network television. See Arizona Wranglers Football Club, Inc. V. NFL, No. 84-7484 (S.D.N.Y.
1984).
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Although Congress recognized that nonuniformity in television contract
negotiations was a legitimate justification for granting sports leagues this
limited exemption 55 from the Sherman Act, Congress failed to address
the obvious inequities created by the decisions in Federal Baseball and
Toolson, which excluded professional baseball from federal antitrust
laws, and Radovich, which held that professional football was subject to
federal antitrust laws. 56
The next major antitrust challenge in professional football occurred
in American Football League v. NFL. 57 The newly created American
Football League (AFL) and its franchise owners alleged that the NFL
and its franchise owners "monopolized, attempted to monopolize and
conspired to monopolize" major league professional football. 58 The AFL
challenged that the NFL used its market power to prevent or impede the
formation of the AFL by monopolizing the most desirable franchise locations.59 The court held that, although the NFL enjoyed a natural monopoly in certain cities,6O the NFL did not misuse the natural monopoly
"to gain a competitive advantage for teams located in other cities, or for
the league as a whole."61 The court stated:
It frequently happens that a first competitor in the field will
acquire sites which a latecomer may think more desirable than
the remaining available sites, but the firstcomer is not required
to surrender any, or all, of its desirable sites to the latecomer
simply to enable the latecomer to compete more effectively with
it. There is no basis in antitrust laws for a contention that
American, whose Boston, Buffalo, Houston, Denver and San
Diego teams enjoy natural monopolies, has a right to complain
that National does not surrender to it other natural monopoly
locations so that they too may be enjoyed by American rather
than by National. When one has acquired a natural monopoly
by means which are neither exclusionary, unfair, nor predatory,
he is not disempowered to defend his position fairly.62

The results of antitrust challenges to the NFL's power to negotiate
television contracts on behalf of league members, and its right to monopolize franchise territories, illustrate the recognition by Congress and the
courts that individual members of sports leagues need to act in concert in
certain circumstances. In the early 1970's, however, antitrust challenges
55.Id.
56. See supra notes 27-40 and accompanying text. Congressional enactment of 15
U.S.c. § 1294 (1982) left antitrust laws unaffected as regards to other activities of
professional sports contracts. 15 U.S.c. § 1294 (1982).
57. 205 F. Supp. 60 (D. Md. 1962), aff'd, 323 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1963).
58. [d. at 62.
59. [d. at 63.
60. Currently, the NFL teams enjoy natural monopolies in all of their territories except
New York (Giants and Jets) and Los Angeles (Rams and Raiders).
61. American Football League, 323 F.2d at 131.
62. /d. (citations omitted).
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to some of the most basic attributes of the existing internal structure of
sports leagues brought an abrupt end to their insulation from antitrust
laws. Many of the successful antitrust challenges have been directed toward the effect of contractual terms used by the leagues to control the
movement of players among league clubs. 63 The most celebrated challenge, however, involves feuding among NFL owners over the movement
of league franchises.
IV.

A.

SPORTS FRANCHISE RELOCATION

The Raiders Case: Background

The NFL, like other sports leagues,64 has sought to control the geographic territories occupied by its league members. Rule 4.3 of article 4
of the NFL Constitution (rule 4.3) provides that three-fourths of the
league's members must approve any request to relocate a franchise before
relocation can occur.65
Prior to 1978, the NFL's rule requiring league approval of an
owner's request to relocate his franchise was not contested by either
league owners or outsiders. 66 In 1978, however, a series of events began
that culminated in the first challenge to the NFL's right to control
franchise relocation. The owner of the Los Angeles Rams decided to
relocate his team from Los Angeles, California to Anaheim, California. 67
The NFL owners approved the relocation, but this left a major stadium
facility, the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum,68 without a professional
football tenant.
In response to this void, the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission petitioned the NFL for the creation of an expansion franchise to
be located in the Coliseum. 69 When the Coliseum Commission was un63. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976); Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp.

64.
65.

66.

67.
68.

69.

867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia
Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
See Robertson, 389 F. Supp. at 873-76; Philadelphia World Hockey Club, 351 F.
Supp. at 465-67.
NFL CONST. AND BYLAWS art. IV, § 4.3 (1982). Rule 4.3 states:
The League shall have exclusive control of the exhibition of football games
by member clubs within the home territory of each member. No member
club shall have the right to transfer its franchise or playing site to a different city, either within or outside its home territory, without prior approval
by the affirmative vote of three-fourths of the existing member clubs of the
League.
[d.
Cf Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. NFL v. Oakland Raiders, Ltd., 469 U.S. 990 (1984).
[d. at 1384.
The Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum has hosted such events as the 1932 and 1984
Summer Olympic Games. It also is home to the University of Southern California
Trojans and, until recently, was home to the UCLA Bruins.
Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n, 726 F.2d at 1384. Cf S. 259,99th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1985); H.R. 751, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (requiring the NFL to create
expansion franchises in Baltimore and Oakland by 1988 and 1990, respectively).
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successful in its efforts to convince the league to create an expansion
franchise in Los Angeles, it began negotiations with the managing general partner of the Oakland Raiders.7° On March 1, 1980, the Raiders
announced to the NFL that they would be moving the Raiders to Los
Angeles.7 1 Pursuant to the requirements of rule 4.3,72 the NFL owners
voted, but overwhelmingly rejected the proposed relocation. 73 In response, the Coliseum Commission and the Raiders promptly filed suit
alleging that the NFL's present system of control, requiring approval of a
proposed franchise relocation by three-fourths of the league's owners, violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. 74 The question posed to the court,
therefore, was whether the NFL's practice of requiring league approval
of a proposed franchise relocation was a conspiracy in restraint of trade
or commerce. 75

B.

The Raiders Case: Legal Analysis

The antitrust analysis of the NFL's regulation of franchise movement can be reduced to three basic issues: 1) whether members of a NFL
association can conspire within the meaning of section 1 of the Sherman
Act; 76 2) if conspiracy is determined, whether the conspiracy is per se
illegal; 77 and 3) if the conspiracy is not per se illegal, whether the NFL
practice of regulating franchise movement is an unreasonable restraint on
competition. 78
1.

Single Entity Rule -

Can the Members of the NFL Conspire?

To invoke section 1 of the Sherman Act, there must be a contract,
combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade.7 9 In Nelson Radio &
Supply v. Motorola,80 the court said, "[i]t is basic in the law of conspiracy
that you must have two persons or entities to have a conspiracy."81 The
NFL has maintained that it is incapable of conspiring to restrain trade
under the Sherman Act because it is a single economic entity.82 The
NFL claims that the "unitary nature of the product it creates -NFL
70.
71.
72.
73.

Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n, 726 F.2d at 1384.
Id.
See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm 'n, 726 F.2d at 1385. "[T]he NFL teams
voted on March 10, 1980 22-0 against the move, with five teams abstaining . . .
[despite the Raiders'] objection that Rule 4.3 is illegal under the antitrust laws .... "
Id.
74.Id.
75. Id. at 1387.
76. See infra notes 84-103 and accompanying text.
77. See infra notes 104-111 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 112-21 and accompanying text.
79. Nelson Radio & Supply v. Motorola, 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952).
80.Id.
81. Id. at 914.
82. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 519 F. Supp. 581, 583 (C.D. Cal.
1981), aff'd, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. NFL v. Oakland Raiders, Ltd., 469 U.S. 990 (1984).
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football - necessarily implies that it is a single . . . firm selling a single
product involving a necessary contribution from each member."83
The NFL's position is supported by the holding in San Francisco
Seals Ltd. v. National Hockey League. 84 In San Francisco Seals, the Seals
filed an antitrust action against the National Hockey League (NHL) and
its members claiming that the league unlawfully had prevented the team
from relocating the franchise from San Francisco to British Columbia.
Like the NFL, the NHL rules required league approval of a member's
request to relocate a franchise. 85 The United States District Court for
the Central District of California did not address the legitimacy of the
approval rule under the antitrust laws; instead, the court held that the
NHL is incapable of conspiring to restrain trade within the meaning of
section 1 of the Sherman Act because it is a single economic entity.86
In Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. NFL,87 the league
sought protection within the ambit of the holding in San Francisco Seals.
The NFL contended that its "league structure was in essence a single
entity akin to a partnership or joint venture,88 precluding application [of
section 1]."89 The Coliseum and the Raiders rejected this position and
asserted that the league was composed of twenty-eight separate legal en83. Id. For a detailed discussion of the NFL's status as a group of separate entities, see
Grauer, Recognition of the National Football League as a Single Entity Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act: Implications of the Consumer Welfare Model, 82 MICH.
L. REV. 1 (1983).
84. 379 F. Supp. 966 (c.n. Cal. 1974).
85. Id. at 968.
86. Id. at 968-71. The court's holding also was based on its determination that the
denial of the move had no anticompetitive effect. Id. Cf North American Soccer
League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir.) (characterizing the NFL as a joint venture,
but not to the extent of exempting the league from the antitrust laws), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1074 (1982). The court said:
The sound and more just procedure is to judge the legality of such restraints according to well-recognized standards of our antitrust laws
rather than permit their exemption on the ground that since they in some
measure strengthen the league competitively as a "single economic entity,"
the combination's anticompetitive effects must be disregarded.
Id. at 1257-58.
87. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. NFL v. Oakland Raiders, Ltd., 469
U.S. 990 (1984).
88. /d. at 1387. Neither a partnership nor a joint venture is immune from scrutiny
under section 1. See generally E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW §§ 9.14.15 (1980). In Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951), the
appellant contended that its practice of allocating trade territories among its international partners, British Timken and French Timken, did not violate the Sherman
Act because it was not a joint venture. The court disagreed:
[We do not] find any support in reason or authority for the proposition
that agreements between legally separate persons and companies to suppress competition among themselves and others can be justified by labeling
the project a ''joint venture." Perhaps every agreement and combination
to restrain trade could be so labeled.
/d. at 598.
89. Id. at 598; Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm 'n, 726 F.2d at 1387.
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tities that acted independently.90 Notwithstanding San Francisco Seals,91
the Ninth Circuit held that the league is a group of separate economic
entities. 92 The court stated:
The member clubs are all independently owned. Most are corporations, some are partnerships, and apparently a few are sole
proprietorships. Although a large portion of league revenue,
approximately 90%, is divided equally among the teams, profits
and losses are not shared, a feature common to partnerships or
other "single entities." In fact, profits vary widely despite the
sharing of revenue. The disparity in profits can be attributed to
independent management policies regarding coaches, players,
management personnel, ticket prices, concessions, luxury box
seats, as well as franchise location, all of which contribute to
fan support and other income sources. . . . [In addition], in
certain areas of the country, where two teams operate in close
proximity, there is also competition for fan support, local television and local radio revenues, and media space. 93
Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in Los
Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission. 94 The NFL, therefore, failed to
obtain single entity status and thereby achieve the antitrust exemption it
consistently has been denied. 95
90. 726 F.2d at 1387.
91. Id. at 1390. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was not persuaded by San
Francisco Seals, but did not elaborate beyond offering its view that the NFL should
not be immune from the Sherman Act. Id. at 1387 nA. The district court, however, distinguished San Francisco Seals. The court reasoned that in San Francisco
Seals, unlike the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n, the team was "not being
prevented from moving into another team's home territory." See Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 519 F. Supp. 581, 585 (C.D. Cal. 1981). Thus,
the district court interpreted San Francisco Seals to uphold the NHL's rule restricting franchise location because the rule does not impede competition. In Los Angeles
Memorial Coliseum Comm'n, the effect of the NFL's rule restricting franchise location prevented two teams, the Rams and the Raiders, from competing economically
in the same territory. In its opinion, however, the district court may have endorsed
unknowingly the NFL's rule in the situation where an NFL team seeks relocation in
an otherwise unoccupied territory.
92. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n, 726 F.2d at 1390.
93. Id. at 1389-90.
94. NFL v. Oakland Raiders, Ltd., 469 U.S. 990 (1984). The single entity issue was
also on appeal when the Supreme Court denied certiorari in North American Soccer
League v. NFL, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982). Justice Rehnquist filed a stinging dissent to
the certiorari denial in which he stated that under the decision of the court of appeals, "the maxim that the antitrust laws exist to protect competition, not competitors, may be reduced to a dead letter." Id. at 1080 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (quoting
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) where the Court said
"the antitrust laws ... were enacted for the protection of competition not competitors"). Id.
95. See, e.g., Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n, 726 F.2d 1381; North Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982). In
many cases, rules governing player contracts have been held to violate section 1 of
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Per Se or Rule of Reason Analysis

It is now clear that the NFL is an association capable of conspiring
in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 96 The next step in the antitrust analysis involves an evaluation of the alleged conspiracy to determine whether it constitutes an unreasonable restraint on trade. In
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. eBs,97 the Court said, "in construing and applying the Sherman Act's ban against contracts, conspiracies and combinations in restraint of trade, certain agreements or practices are so 'plainly
anticompetitive' and so often 'lack ... any redeeming virtue,'98 that they
are conclusively presumed illegal without further examination under the
rule of reason generally applied in Sherman Act cases."99
In Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission, the district court
held that the NFL rule restricting franchise relocation was not per se
illegaPOO because the NFL's rule actually promoted competition to some
extent. The district court explained: "it cannot be said that [those agreements] have a 'pernicious effect on competition' or that they lack 'any
redeeming virtue.' "101 Each member of a sports league is dependent on
the financial success of other team owners.102 If a team is financially
unsuccessful then that team will not be able to compete effectively for
quality players. 103 One team's financial troubles will defeat the NFL's
goal of parity in its athletic contests, thereby diminishing the NFL's
competitive balance. 104 Consequently, the court in Los Angeles Memo-

96.
97.
98.
99.

100.

101.

102.
103.
104.

the Sherman Act. Compare Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (NFL draft as existed in 1968 constituted an unreasonable restraint on trade)
with Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 801
(1977) (free agent compensation system constituted an unreasonable restraint on
trade) and Kapp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd, 586 F.2d 644
(9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979) (certain NFL rules governing
player contracts held violative of antitrust laws).
Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n V. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. NFL V. Oakland Raiders, Ltd., 469 U.S. 990 (1984); North Am.
Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982).
441 U.S. 1 (1979).
Id. at 7-8; see also Northern Pac. Ry. CO. V. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
Broadcast Music, Inc. V. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1979); National Society of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978); Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 (1977).
Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n, 726 F.2d at 1392; see also North Am.
Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982);
Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Mackey v. NFL, 543
F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977). But cf United States
v. Topco Ass'n, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) ("an agreement between competitors
at the same level of the market structure to allocate territories in order to minimize
competition" is per se illegal).
Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n V. NFL, 468 F. Supp. 154, 166 (C.D. Cal.
1979), aff'd. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. NFL v. Oakland Raiders, Ltd., 469 U.S. 990 (1984).
See J. WEISTART & c. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS 696-97 (1979); see also Los
Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm 'n, 726 F.2d at 1396.
J. WEISTART & c. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS 697 (1979).
[d.
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rial Coliseum Commission analyzed the NFL's rule regulating franchise
movement under the rule of reason to determine whether the practice
constituted an unreasonable restraint on trade. 105

3.

Rule of Reason Analysis

Under the rule of reason, a plaintiff alleging a conspiracy in restraint
of trade must "prove that an adverse impact on competition in a relevant
market exists."106 In a normal antitrust case, the practice of providing
exclusive territories for business franchises is unlawful per se because the
practice restricts market participation in order to regulate supply and
thereby control prices. 107 According to the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission trial court, the NFL's goals in providing its members
with exclusive territories were legitimate and, therefore, not per se ille105. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n, 726 F.2d at 1392; see also Los Angeles
Memorial Coliseum, 468 F. Supp. at 166.
106. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n, 726 F.2d at 1392. It is crucial in any
antitrust analysis to pinpoint the precise "market" that is adversely affected by an
agreement alleged to be in restraint of trade. According to the A TIORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITIEE To STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 322 (1955),
"the market is the sphere of competitive rivalry within which the crucial transfer ·of
buyer's patronage from one supplier of goods or services to another can take place
freely." Id. For purposes of the NFL's rule 4.3, the court in Los Angeles Memorial
Coliseum Comm 'n noted that any market consists of a product market and a geographic market. The product market consists of the type of product the competitors
are distributing. The geographic market is the area where the competitors sell their
products. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm 'n, 726 F.2d at 1392-93; see generally KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW §§ 12.2-.4 (1980).
There has been much dispute as to what constitutes a particular market. For
example, in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm 'n, the NFL argued that the
product market was the entire entertainment market and the geographic market was
the United States. The Raiders argued that the product market was NFL football
and the geographic market was Southern California. The Coliseum claimed that the
product market was stadia offering their facilities to NFL teams in the geographic
market of the United States. See Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm 'n, 726
F.2d at 1393. The court ultimately evaded the issue as not necessary to assist the
jury in determining whether rule 4.3 "reasonably served the NFL's interest .... "
Id. at 1394.
The resolution of this issue involves several questions:
1. What products would the public choose instead of NFL football?
a. other sporting events played at the same time;
b. other forms of non-sporting entertainment; or
c. other NFL football games played at the same time.
2. What geographical area does the product market encompass?
a. a local region; or
b. the whole country.
The focus of the relevant market analysis should be on those who support professional football. The product market should consist of all other products considered by supporters of professional football in lieu of an NFL football game and the
geographical area should encompass that area where these products are available.
The product market consists of other sporting events offered at the same time as an
NFL game and the geographical area is the entire nation because alternative sporting events are televised all over the country. Consequently, competition for an NFL
home game comes from other home or televised sporting events.
107. See United States v. Topco Ass'n, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 611 (1972).
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gal. \08 The court stated:
Exclusive territories aid new franchises in achieving financial
stability, which protects the large initial investment an owner
must make to start up a football team. Stability arguably helps
ensure no one team has an undue advantage on the field. Territories foster fan loyalty which in turn promotes traditional rivalries between teams, -each contributing to attendance at
games and television viewing. \09
The court also recognized that in order to effectuate the NFL's right
to negotiate lucrative television contracts, the NFL must have "some
control over the placement of teams to ensure NFL football is popular in
a diverse group of markets." 110 The NFL also has a legitimate interest in
prohibiting relocations because such prohibitions allow cities to recover
substantial investments made in stadiums and other facilities. I I I The
trial court, therefore, held that the NFL had legitimate reasons for regulating the territories of its members.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit also was persuaded by many of the
NFL's arguments regarding the legitimacy of its rule. I 12 The court, however, was "not persuaded the jury should have concluded" that rule 4.3
was a reasonable means to effectuate those interests. 113 The court advised the NFL that "an express recognition and consideration of the objective factors espoused by the NFL as important, such as population,
economic projections, facilities, regional balance, etc., would be well advised."114 Although the NFL convinced the court that it had a right to
regulate franchise relocation, the court recognized that right only to the
extent that it was implemented objectively. The overwhelming problem
with rule 4.3 was that it granted the NFL arbitrary power to grant or
deny an owner's request to relocate. In Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum
Commission, "testimony indicated that some owners, as well as Commissioner Pete Rozelle, dislike[d] Al Davis and consider[ed] him a maverick."115 This suggested that the vote against the Raiders' move could
have been motivated by animosity rather than business judgment. 116 Because there was no evidence of an objective decision-making process, rule
4.3 in its present form violated the rule of reason because of the potential
anticompetitive effect. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit sustained the
108.
109.
IlD.
111.
112.
113.

114.
liS.
116.

Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n, 726 F.2d at 1396.
[d.
[d.
[d. "Of the 13 stadium complexes built in the United States since 1970, taxpayers
helped finance 12, typically through the sale of government bonds, but sometimes
through outright tax increases." The Baltimore Sun, Jan. 24, 1985 at 8A, col. 4.
Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n, 726 F.2d at 1396.
/d.
[d. at 1397 (emphasis added).
[d. at 1398.
[d. at 1397.
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Raiders' right to relocate to Los Angeles. 117
V.

THE EFFECT OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S HOLDING IN
LOS ANGELES MEMORIAL COLISEUM COMMISSION

After the unfavorable decision in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum
Commission, the NFL petitioned for review in the United States Supreme
Court. I IS In the interim, Robert Irsay, the owner of the Baltimore Colts,
displeased with the condition of Baltimore's Memorial Stadium, his
treatment by the press, and poor attendance at Colt games, moved the
Colts to Indianapolis. 1I9 The NFL "took no action, one way or the
other, on the Colts' relocation" largely because the league was still seeking clarification from the Supreme Court on its authority to control
franchise relocation and, pending such clarification, NFL owners feared
that any further attempt to preserve league stability would result in another antitrust lawsuit. 120
In spite of the league's silence, the Colts' abrupt move to Indianapolis provoked increased concern among mayors, sports leagues, and Congress over how to restore franchise stability. 121 This concern was
heightened by two events. First, the NFL lost its bid for judicial clarification of the Ninth Circuit's holding in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum
Commission when the Supreme Court declined to review that decision. 122
The second event occurred only a month later when the Philadelphia
Eagles, "a well-supported NFL club with 50 years of history [announced
plans to leave) the country's fourth largest market for a smaller city,
[Phoenix), where the United States Football League already had a
franchise."123 In view of these two critical events, the NFL decided to
abandon its "no action" stance and once again oppose a relocation. The
NFL sued the Eagles "to confirm the League's right to evaluate a proposed franchise move in concrete terms," and to require the Eagles to
justify their relocation from a well-established market. 124 The suit was
very significant because it would have tested the effectiveness, under the
antitrust laws, of the NFL's newly adopted objective standards. But the
test never materialized because the suit eventually was settled when the
117. /d.
118. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. NFL v. Oakland Raiders Ltd., 469 U.S. 990 (1984).
119. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
120. Professional Sports Community Protection Act of 1985: Hearings on S. 259 and S.
287 Before the Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation United States Senate, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1985) (statement of Pete Rozelle, Commissioner, National Football League).
121. Id.
122. NFL v. Oakland Raiders, Ltd., 469 U.S. 990 (1984).
123. Professional Sports Community Protection Act of 1985: Hearings on S.259 and S.287
Before the Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation United States, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1985) (statement of Pete Rozelle, Commissioner, National Football League).
124.Id.
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Eagles agreed to remain in Philadelphia. 125 Nonetheless, the suit did
have an important role; it focused substantial public attention on the
franchise movement problem.

A.

Objective Guidelines.

Following the Ninth Circuit's decision in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission and the ensuing events, Commissioner Pete Rozelle
established "procedures and policy to apply to league consideration, pursuant to [rule] 4.3 of the [NFL] Constitution and Bylaws, of any proposed transfer of a home territory." 126 The NFL established the new
procedures, but expressed reservations as to whether they would withstand scrutiny under current legal precedent. 127 Despite the legal confusion, however, the NFL was determined to stem the tide of franchise
relocation and restore franchise stability to the league.
Under the new guidelines, an owner is required to give written notice of a proposed move to other league owners by January fifteenth of
the year of the proposed relocation. This notice must be accompanied by
a statement of the owner's reasons for the proposed move. 128 The statement of reasons for the proposed relocation must include the following
information:1) a comparison of team revenues with league averages and
medians; 2) a comparison of past and projected stadium revenues at the
existing and proposed locations; 3) audited annual financial and profit
and loss statements for the last four seasons; 4) operations of other professional and college sports in the existing and proposed locations; 5)
effects of the relocation on scheduling patterns, travel requirements of
other teams, divisional alignments, traditional rivalries, television patterns and interests, quality of stadium facilities, and the possible reaction
of fans and the general public; 6) copies of the current stadium lease and
other current agreements regarding concessions, luxury boxes, score
board advertising, parking, and practice facilities; 7) financial analyses of
projected lease and other arrangements in proposed location as compared
with those in the existing locations; and 8) budget projections for the first
three years in the new location. 129 Finally, the owners review the information and three-fourth's majority vote is needed to approve
relocation. 130
These guidelines appear to be in accord with the Ninth Circuit's
suggestion in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission. They represent an objective process which considers relevant criteria designed to
reflect the legitimate concerns of the league and its host cities. Any restraints imposed by the league, if based upon an objective application of
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

[d.
[d.
!d.
[d. at 69-71.
!d.
[d.
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the new procedures, should survive scrutiny under the rule of reason.
The rule of reason recognizes that a restraint may be based upon valid
considerations and, therefore, not illegal under the antitrust laws. 13 1
"The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether
it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition."132
The NFL is not convinced that an objective application of its new
procedures will withstand scrutiny under the antitrust laws.13 3 According to the league, there exists legal confusion over the franchise relocation issue and legislative action is needed to rectify the problem. 134 The
view of other professional leagues is that they should be entitled to a
limited antitrust exemption over agreements to restrain franchise relocation. J35 This view, however, is not shared by all. Howard Cosell, testifying before the Committee on the Judiciary, stated that Congressional
action is unnecessary to resolve the antitrust problem. 136 Instead, he recommended that the NFL need only do what the Ninth Circuit said in
Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission: formulate objective standards for evaluating a proposed relocation and then reduce its vote on
the issue to a majority.J37 The NFL disputes the solution suggested by
Mr. Cosell as unsupported by the Ninth Circuit's holding. The league
contends that the Ninth Circuit's statement on the need for objective
standards was merely dicta and thus the court made no ruling on the
legal effectiveness of objective standards. 138
131. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
132. Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
133. Professional Sports Community Protection Act of 1985: Hearings on S. 259 and S.
287 Before the Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation United States Senate, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1985) (statement of Pete Rozelle, Commissioner, National Football League).
134. Professional Sports Antitrust Immunity: Hearings on S. 172, S. 259, and S. 298
Before the Comm. on the Judiciary United States Senate, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 60-64
(1985) (statement of Jay Moyer, Counsel to the Commissioner, National Football
League, New York, N.Y., Accompanied by Paul Tagliabue, Co-Counsel, National
Football League).
135. See, e.g., Professional Sports Community Protection Act of 1985: Hearings on S. 259
and S. 287 Before the Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation United
States Senate, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 54-58 (1985) (statement of Peter Ueberroth,
Commissioner of Major League Baseball). Major League Baseball is opposed to any
legislative action to correct the franchise relocation problem. Commissioner Ueberroth said: "The federal government should not be involved in [league decisions relating to the number and movement of franchises] legislatively, and the record
shows that the imposition of federal antitrust liability by the judiciary leads to
franchise instability, rather than enhanced franchise stability. Id.
136. Professional Sports Antitrust Immunity: Hearings on S. 172. S. 259 and S. 298
Before the Comm. on the Judiciary United States Senate, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 46-56
(1985) (statement of Howard Cosell, ABC Public Relations, New York, N.Y.).
137. [d.
138. Professional Sports Antitrust Immunity: Hearings on S. 172. S. 259 and S. 298
Before the Comm. on the Judiciary United States Senate. 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 61
(1985) (statement of Jay Moyer, Counsel to the Commissioner, National Football
League, New York, N.Y., accompanied by Paul Tagliabue, Co-Counsel, National
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The NFL's concern over the legal effectiveness of objective standards relates to the components of those standards. 139 The league believes that they must be permitted to consider the interests of the team's
current community.140 In this regard, Jay Moyer, counsel to the NFL
Commissioner, pointed to the NBA's current standards which make no
"reference to the record of a team in its current community, or any reference to the interests of that community in the continued presence of its
team." 141 The NBA has omitted reference to the interests of the community on advice from its lawyers that "under the Ninth Circuit's majority
decision in the Raiders case, they cannot even consider the interests of
the team's current community without risking a serious violation of the
antitrust laws and heavy damages."142 In view of this advice, the NFL
believes that Congressional action is necessary so that a league can consider the interests of a team's community without risking further liability
under the antitrust laws. 143 The NFL claims that the Congressional action should be in the form of a limited antitrust exemption over agreements to restrain franchise relocations. 144

139.
140.

141.

142.
143.
144.

Football League). Mr. Moyer disagreed with Mr. Cosell's interpretation of the
Ninth Circuit's statement. He said:
As to objective standards in the Raiders case a badly divided Court by a 2to-1 majority entered into its opinion a paragraph's worth of dicta....
There is nothing in that court's opinion or in the opinion of any other
court in a comparable case that provides the National Football League or
any other sports league with any reasonable assurance that simply promulgating standards would resolve the problem.
Id.
Id. at 62.
Id. See also Professional Sports Community Protection Act of 1985: Hearings on S.
259 and S. 287 Before the Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation United
States Senate, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 54-58 (1985) (statement of Peter Ueberroth,
Commissioner of Major League Baseball). Mr. Ueberroth emphasized baseball's desire to consider the interests of the local community when evaluating a proposed
relocation. He said:
The perspective of both leagues and the Commissioner in evaluating potential relocations is much broader than that of the particular team involved. While the interests of that team are necessarily important, so are
those of the local fans and the public. . . . Baseball has made every effort
over the years to act responsibly on matters relating to the number and
movement of franchises. And in making decisions on those issues, baseball has always attempted to take into account the interests of the fans and
the public.
Id. at 56.
Professional Sports Antitrust Immunity: Hearings on S. 172, S. 259 and S. 298
Before the Comm. on the Judiciary United States Senate, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 62
(1985) (statement of Jay Moyer, Counsel to the Commissioner, National Football
League, New York, N.Y. accompanied by Paul Tag1iabue, Co-Counsel, National
Football League).
/d.
Id.
Id. at 83.

586
B.

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 15

Congressional Intervention

The new procedures established by the NFL demonstrate the
league's internal resolve to ensure franchise stability. Nevertheless, the
uncertainty over the legal effectiveness of the new procedures has precipitated Congressional intervention. Several bills designed to rectify the
franchise movement problem were introduced at the 99th Congress. 145
The bills range from proposals to bar relocations to proposals to create
an unrestricted relocation system. 146 In the middle, are several bills that
would subject franchise relocation requests to an objective decision making process.
The Professional Sports Community Protection Act of 1985, S. 259,
was introduced by Senator Eagleton and is co-sponsored by Senator
Danforth and other members of the Senate. 147 The Act provides sports
leagues with a broad antitrust exemption over the enforcement of rules
preventing a team relocation. 148 According to the bill, league decisions
on relocation would be subject to a variety of procedures and a determination must be based upon specified criteria and other appropriate factors which must be considered and upon which written findings must be
made. 149 Any decision is subject to judicial review by a federal district
145. S. 259, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); S. 287, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); S. 298, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); S. 172, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R. 885, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1985); H.R. 510, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R. 785, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1985); H.R. 956, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
146. Professional Sports Antitrust Immunity: Hearings on S. 172, S. 259 and S. 298
Before the Comm. on the Judiciary United States Senate, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 314
(1985) (Rosenberg, Morton, Proposed Sports Relocation Legislation: Background
and Legal Implications).
147. S. 259, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., Professional Sports Antitrust Immunity: Hearings on S.
172, S. 259 and S. 298 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary United States Senate, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 209 (1985).
148. Id. at § § 4(1), 4(2), 4(3) and 4(4).
149. Id. at § 6(b). The criteria are: (I) the adequacy of such member club's existing
stadium or arena in relation to other stadiums or arenas with such league; (2) the
adequacy of facilities related to or in the vicinity of such stadium or arena, including
transportation, vending, retail and other facilities; (3) the desire and ability of the
owner or operator of such stadium, arena or facilities and officials of local government to remedy any inadequacies in such stadium, arenas or facilities, or to provide
other incentives or arrangements which would make it reasonable and appropriate
for such member club to be located in its home territory; (4) the extent to which
such member club has, directly or indirectly, received public financial support by
means of construction of any publicly financed playing facility, special tax treatment, or other form of public financial support, and the extent to which such support continues or remains unamortized; (5) the effects of such change on any
contract or agreement entered into by such member club and any public or private
party; (6) the extent to which ownership or management of such member club has
contributed to any circumstance that might demonstrate the need for a change in
the member club's operating revenues from sports operations, including net revenues from ticket and other stadium or arena receipts from games played in the
member club's stadium or arena, in relation to the median and average levels or
revenues for other member clubs in the three seasons preceding the date of the
member club's notice furnished under section 5 of this act; (8) the extent of any net
operating losses experienced by such member club, exclusive of depreciation and
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court and may be set aside if not supported by substantial evidence or if
obtained by fraud, corruption, or undue means. 150 In addition, host cities also may seek review under the antitrust laws. 151
The NFL views S. 259 as a "starting point" for the resolution of the
franchise relocation problem. 152 In this regard, the NFL supports certain aspects of the bill. The NFL stated:
[So 259] authorizes professional sports leagues to keep well supported teams in their existing home territories; it involves no
license for leagues to relocate well supported teams; it recognizes that team stability in professional sports cannot be
achieved by outside direction but must be accompanied by
sound league operating practices; it leaves decision-making on
team location matters with leagues themselves while identifying
certain of the many factors that leagues would consider in making those decisions; and it provides for outside judicial
review. 153
The NFL does not completely support S. 259, however, because the
bill does not expressly eliminate conspiracy liability under the antitrust
laws. 154
Another bill before Congress is the Professional Sports Team Community Protection Act, S. 287, co-sponsored by Senator Gorton and
other members of the Senate. 155 S. 287 establishes a more complex procedure designed to prevent relocations. 156 More specifically, S. 287 re-

150.
151.
152.

153.
154.
155.
156.

amortization, in the three seasons preceding the date of the member club's notice
furnished under section 5 of this Act; (9) the extent to which support for such member club has been demonstrated by attendance, ticket sales, and other factors while
the member club has played in its home territory; (10) the number of professional,
university, and college teams playing in the same sport as the member club which
are currently conducting sports operations in the member club's home territory and
in the proposed location of such member club, and in the effects that the proposed
change in the location of such member club may have on such loans and their
leagues; (II) any bonafide offer to purchase such member club at fair market value,
if such offer includes continued location of such member club in its home territory;
(12) the extent to which such member club has engaged in good faith negotiations
concerning reasonable arrangements under which such member club would continue to be located in its home territory and in its stadium or arena (or a suitable
alternative facility in its home territory).
Id. at § 7.
Id.
Professional Sports Community Protection Act of 1985: Hearings on S. 259 and S.
287 Before the Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation United States Senate, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1985) (statement of Pete Rozelle, Commissioner, National Football League).
Id.
Id. at 67-68.
S. 287, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., Professional Sports Community Protection Act of 1985:
Hearings on S. 259 and S. 287 Before the Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation United States Senate, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1985).
Professional Sports Antitrust Immunity: Hearings on S. 172, S. 259 and S. 298
Before the Comm. on the Judiciary United States Senate, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 321
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quires a team desiring to relocate to comply with strict notice provisions
as well as a requirement that the team cover the expenses of a league
initiated hearing. 157 The league must evaluate the relocation under specified criteria and any decision must be "necessary and appropriate."158 A
league decision is then subject to review by an arbitration board which
has the authority to reject the move. 159 If the league rejects the relocation the board need not review the decision. 160 Judicial review is precluded except to determine whether the criteria were properly
considered. 161 The bill also requires the NFL to increase its membership
by two members by 1988, one of which must be located in Baltimore,
Maryland, and by an additional two members by 1990, one of which
must be located in Oakland, California. 162
The NFL opposes S. 287. In the league's view, S. 287 "establishes
an excessively elaborate new "court or superstructure ... with virtually
unfettered power to determine the location of all professional sports
teams in the United States."163 In addition, the league views "the governmentally forced expansion provisions of the bill as unwarranted in
economic, legal, practical, and policy terms."I64 This bill is an unlikely
candidate because it goes beyond the franchise relocation problem. Forcing the NFL to expand seems an unwarranted intrusion into the League's

157.
158.

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

164.

(1985) (Rosenberg, Morton, Proposed Sports Relocation Legislation: Background
And Legal Implications).
S. 287, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 105, Professional Sports Community Protection Act of
1985: Hearings on S. 259 and S. 287 Before the Comm. on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation United States Senate, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1985).
[d. at § 104. The criteria are: (1) the adequacy of the stadium in which the team
played its home games in the previous season and the willingness of the stadium
authority to remedy any deficiencies in such facility; (2) the extent to which fan
support for the team has been demonstrated during the team's tenure in the community; (3) the extent to which the team has, directly or indirectly, received public
financial support by means of any publicly financed playing facility, special tax
treatment, and any other form of public financial support; (4) the degree to which
the owner or management of the team has contributed to any circumstance which
might otherwise demonstrate the need for such relocation; (5) whether the team has
incurred net operating losses, exclusive of depreciation and amortization, sufficient
to threaten the continued financial viability of the team; (6) the degree to which the
team has engaged in good faith negotiations with members and representatives of
the community concerning terms and conditions under which the team would continue to play its games in such community; (7) whether any other team in its league
is located in the community in which the team is currently located; (8) whether the
team proposes to relocate to a community in which no other team in its league is
located; and (9) whether the stadium authority, if public, is not opposed to such
relocation.
[d. at § 106.
[d.
[d. at § 108.
[d. at § 303.
Professional Sports Community Protection Act of 1985: Hearings on S. 259 and S.
287 Before the Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation United States Senate, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1985) (statement of Pete Rozelle, Commissioner, National Football League).
[d. at 67.
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internal affairs. Expansion will and should occur. It is questionable,
however, whether Congress is acting in an appropriate manner when it
interjects itself into the internal affairs of the NFL.
The final viable bill is the Professional Football Stabilization Act, S.
172, introduced by Senator Specter. 165 This bill only applies to professional football and precludes a relocation unless a stadium lease is
breached, the current stadium is inadequate and there is no intent to
remedy the inadequacies, or the team has lost money for three consecutive years. 166 The NFL does not oppose this bill completely, but it does
find the standards inadequate. 167 The league claims that the standards in
S. 172 do not give appropriate weight to the ability of a community to
support a professional sports team. 168 The league nevertheless has expressed interest in revising the enumerated standards to make the bill
more acceptable. 169 The most undesirable provision is in section 5 170 of
the bill, which provides that the antitrust laws shall not apply to agreements among members of a professional football league to restrain the
relocation of one of the franchises. 171 Instead, S. 172 authorizes any government authority in a municipality from which a team relocates or seeks
to relocate to bring a civil action for equitable and monetary relief in
federal court.172 The bill, however, seems to preclude redress for a
league member who is denied relocation. 173 Thus, a dissatisfied owner is
stripped of any right to contest league action denying relocation. This is
an unwarranted intrusion into the rights of a team owner and should not
be permitted.
The proposals discussed herein provide workable models for a legislative solution. The need for such Congressional action, however, is
questionable. The Ninth Circuit's decision in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission confirmed the NFL's right to control franchise relocation. The only point of dispute involves the methods that the league uses
to evaluate a relocation request. Under the antitrust laws, a reasonable
restraint is permitted. The objective guidelines established by the NFL
are reasonable and find their genesis in valid considerations. Any objective relocation decision by the NFL, therefore, can withstand scrutiny
165. S. 172, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., Professional Sports Antitrust Immunity: Hearings on S.
172, S. 259 and S. 298 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary United States Senate, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1985).
166. Id. at § 4.
167. Professional Sports Antitrust Immunity: Hearings on S. 172, S. 259, and S. 298
Before the Comm. on the Judiciary United States Senate, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 65
(1985) (statement of Jay Moyer, Counsel to the Commissioner, National Football
League, New York, N.Y. accompanied by Paul Tagliabue, Co-Counsel, National
Football League).
168. Id. at 85.
169. Id. at 65.
170. S. 172, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1985).
171. Id.
172. Id. at § 6.
173. Id. at §§ 5 and 6.
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under the antitrust laws. To the extent that the NFL's procedures adequately reflect valid considerations, the antitrust laws provide an adequate mechanism for affirming league action, while providing a sufficient
deterrent to anticompetitive practices.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Professional sports leagues historically have been treated unequally.
These inequities stem from judicial rulings giving various sports leagues
different statuses in the eyes of the law. Baseball is expressly exempt
from federal antitrust laws, the NHL has been found to be a single entity
and thus not subject to federal antitrust laws, and the NFL is subject to
antitrust laws because it is neither expressly exempt from antitrust laws
nor deemed to be a single entity.
Recently, the debate over the legal status of professional team sports
has reached congressional levels. Several bills have been introduced and
Congress has promised that it will take legislative action to correct the
franchise relocation problem. Congressional action is unnecessary to
correct this problem. The antitrust laws provide a workable mechanism
for resolving disputes involving professional sports leagues. In the context of franchise relocation, league rejection of a proposed move should
be subject to independent review by the courts and courts will not disturb
league action that is based upon valid considerations.
The Ninth Circuit's holding in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum
Commission, permitting the Raiders to move to Los Angeles, was based
on the possibility that the NFL's decision opposing the Raider's request
to relocate to Los Angeles was motivated by consideration of arbitrary
and improper criteria. Such consideration violates federal antitrust laws
and for that reason the Ninth Circuit's decision was appropriate. Thus,
the antitrust laws were successful in remedying a potentially anticompetitive process.
Federal antitrust laws are an effective tool with which to resolve
disputes involving professional sports leagues. So long as sports leagues
act objectively and do not discriminate against individual members and
host cities, their practices will survive scrutiny under the federal antitrust
laws.
Whatever solution is ultimately adopted, it must place primary emphasis on the rights of the fans and the interests of the host city. If sports
leagues are to continue to provide a profitable and marketable product,
their policies should be set internally and objectively so as to reflect not
only pure monetary considerations, but also the interests of the fans.
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